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Abstract 
Openness to international competition can lead to enhanced resource allocation in the 
long-run.  While factor reallocation is essential if net benefits are to be derived from trade 
liberalization,  the  process  generates  costs  both  for  transitioning  workers  and  for 
employers  undergoing  personnel  turnover.    Net  welfare  gains  depend  on  adjustment 
costs.  Understanding of these issues has been hampered by data limitations.  In this 
paper, we overcome some of these limitations by using new, harmonized measures on job 
creation and destruction for a number of countries in Latin America.  We use these new 
series to investigate the impact of the removal of protectionism on net employment and 
gross job reallocation in Latin America.  We find a robust pattern showing that reductions 
in tariffs and exchange rate appreciations increase the pace of job reallocation within 
sectors.  We also find, however, some evidence of declining net employment as trade 
exposure  increases.  For  example,  we  find  some  evidence  that  in  the  wake  of  tariff 
reductions, there is lower net employment growth.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Assessment of the effects of trade liberalization on the reallocation of resources is 
essential.    Reallocation  is  at  the  heart  of  welfare  gains  from  openness  as  factor 
deployment becomes more efficient.  Also, reallocation is at the heart of potential factor 
adjustment and displacement costs induced by tariff reductions.  Net welfare gains result 
if the benefits from higher productivity  exceed the costs due to factor redeployment.  
Inefficient firms in import competing industries exposed to tariff reductions experience 
lower profitability of some projects and thus contract, and in some cases are forced to 
shut down all production facilities.  At the same time, the increased openness creates new 
export opportunities for other producers leading to expansion of both better positioned 
incumbents and new startups.  Openness facilitates links required to expand into foreign 
markets.    For  example,  access  to  technology  embodied  in  imported  equipment  and 
machinery  can  yield  higher  productivity  for  those  firms  able  to  take  advantage.  
Moreover,  exposure  to  foreign  competition  generates  shifts  of  market  share  among 
producers within tradable industries. 
In addition to reallocation due to downsizing of less productive firms in favor of 
more productive ones, new information gets revealed after policy changes. Firms partly 
learn how well they adapt to the new market place after they have operating under the 
new conditions for some time, as with any change in the economic environment.  Some 
firms may realize they are not competitive relative to foreign producers.  Other firms may 
have  enhanced  incentives  to  adopt  new  technologies  in  their  efforts  to  expand  their 
markets.  At the same time, trade openness can be associated with higher volatility of 
demand shocks facing firms.  Also, competition is likely to increase the elasticity of 
employment to changes in relative prices, including those generated by real exchange rate 
fluctuations.    All  of  these  effects  taken  together  suggest  greater  factor  reallocation.  
Moreover, since trade reforms in Latin America have also been accompanied by labor   3 
market  reforms  intended  in  principle  to  make  labor  adjustment  more  flexible,  the 
increased incentives for reallocation may be enhanced by reduced adjustment costs. 
While  it  is  well  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  explore  fully  the  welfare 
implications  of  trade  and  labor  market  reforms,  understanding  the  reallocation 
implications of reform is a key component of the welfare implications.  One of the most 
controversial  debates  on  institutional  design  and  economic  policy  has  been  sparked 
around the tradeoffs associated with greater flexibility of product and labor markets.  On 
the  one  hand,  greater  flexibility  of  product  and  labor  markets  can  imply  improved 
efficiency and productivity as economic forces induce the allocation of resources to their 
highest valued use.  On the other hand, greater flexibility can imply greater uncertainty 
for workers and firms with associated concerns about job security and wage inequality.   
While we do not address these deep welfare and policy questions directly, a step 
in this direction is to measure the reallocation consequences of reform.  In this paper, we 
take  such  step  by  exploiting  rich  new  harmonized  statistics  on  job  flows  by  sector, 
country  and  year.    In  particular,  we  assess  to  what  extent  the  increased  competition 
associated with international trade yields increases in the pace of job reallocation within 
sectors  across  Latin  American  countries.    During  the  period  of  study,  many  of  the 
countries in our sample underwent substantial real exchange rate movements yielding 
sectoral  variation  in  trade  exposure.  But,  it is  the  variation  from  large  tariff  declines 
which differ in their timing across countries that allows us to estimate the response of job 
flows to intensified international competition. We identify the effect of trade exposure on 
job flows by studying a set of countries undergoing deep trade liberalization over the 
sample period.   
A unique aspect of our analysis is that we exploit variation in the pace of job 
reallocation  across  time  at  the  sectoral  level  for  a  number  of  countries.    We  use 
harmonized  job  flow  measures  constructed  from  plant-level  data  from  manufacturing 
surveys in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay.  Much of the cross-  4 
country evidence on job flows exploits simple cross-country variation or country-year 
variation.  In contrast, we exploit country, year, and sectoral variation.  Moreover, we 
exploit this variation in a policy environment where there have been significant changes 
in the trade environment along these same dimensions and we have measures of such 
changes through the changes in tariffs at the country, sector and year level of variation.    
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.    Section  2  reviews  the  related  literature.    In 
Section 3, an account is provided of international trade institutions in Latin America with 
special reference to recent episodes of liberalization.  Section 4 describes our dataset and 
discusses the results on the effects of changes in exposure to international trade on job 
reallocation.  Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE   
Traditional  trade  models  predict  factor  reallocation  between  sectors.  When 
barriers to international trade are removed, the classical Ricardian argument predicts a 
redeployment of resources towards sectors with comparative advantage.  The Hecksher-
Ohlin  model  would  predict  expansion  of  sectors  intensive  in  the  relatively  abundant 
factor. The implication of inter-sectoral reallocation is partly driven by the assumption of 
homogeneity among producers within the same sector. Recent models have explored the 
impact of openness to international trade when producers face idiosyncratic shocks. 
To  characterize  the  impact  of  trade  on  aggregate  productivity,  Melitz  (2003) 
assumes that producers have heterogeneous productivity levels and models intra-industry 
reallocations  among  firms  when  faced  with  foreign  competition.    Within  industries 
exposed  to  trade,  increased  openness  leads  to  shifts  in  the  relative  performances  of 
monopolistic competitors reflected in inter-firm reallocations towards more productive 
firms.  In  an  alternative  model  with  similar  results,  Eaton  and  Kortum  (2002)  model 
heterogeneous  producers  in  a  perfectly  competitive  environment.    Constant-returns 
producers  are  subject  to  idiosyncratic  shocks  while  consumers  search  worldwide  for   5 
lowest  prices  of  each  output  variety.  Then,  international  trade  allocates  demand  to 
producers  able  to  supply  output  at  the  lowest  price.  Efficient  technology  (i.e.,  low 
production costs), minimal geographic impediments (i.e., low transportation costs) and 
limited  institutional  distortions  (i.e.,  low  transaction  costs)  allow  producers  to  price 
competitively.  Both  papers  predict  productivity-enhancing  reallocations,  within 
industries, induced by trade.
1 The notion that protectionism shelters inefficient producers 
and that openness makes more productive firms flourish is corroborated by the evidence. 
Self-selection into export markets by more productive plants is well documented 
by Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) for Colombia, Mexico and Morocco; by Bernard 
and Jensen (1999a) for the U.S.; and by Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) for Taiwan. 
Underlying this process is the existence of substantial sunk costs to enter export markets 
documented by Roberts and Tybout (1997) for Colombia and by Bernard and Jensen 
(1999b)  for  the  U.S.  Indeed,  Hallward-Driermayer,  Iarossi  and  Sokoloff  (2002)  have 
argued that the selection process is not necessarily driven by exogenous shocks but rather 
by investments made by firms in anticipation of foreign markets opening up. Decisions 
regarding  organization,  training  and  retooling  to  gain  access  to  export  markets  raise 
relative exporter productivity in East Asia most significantly in Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Thailand. Heterogeneity in the performance of different investment strategies leads to 
trade-induced reallocation. 
Trade not only facilitates the expansion of more productive firms but also causes 
the  downsizing  of  less  productive  plants.  With  respect  to  attrition  induced  by 
international trade, Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) find that exposure to trade forces the 
exit of the least efficient producers in Korea and Taiwan.  Also, Pavnick (2002) finds that 
market  share  reallocations  contributed  significantly  to  productivity  growth  following 
trade liberalization in Chile. Finally, Bernard and Jensen (1999b) find that intra-industry 
reallocations  to  higher  productivity  exporters  can  explain  up  to  20%  of  productivity 
growth in U.S. manufacturing.   6 
There is direct evidence on the impact of international competition on job flows. 
The evidence from plant-panel data for developed countries is suggestive of more trade 
exposure leading to intensification of churning and sometimes negative net effects on 
employment. However, was will be clear below, the results differ substantially across 
countries and studies. For the U.S., Klein, Triest and Schuh (2003) use establishment 
panel data to analyze how the pattern of gross job flows is affected by the path of the real 
exchange  rate.    They  find  that  changes  in  the  trend  of  the  real  exchange  rate  affect 
reallocation but not net employment.  On the other hand, cyclical variation of the real 
exchange rate induces changes in net employment mainly via job destruction.  In a more 
recent study, Klein, Triest and Schuh (2004) investigate the joint impact of tariff and real 
exchange rate changes in the US, with particular reference to NAFTA.  The way in which 
the reduction in tariffs impacted upon job flows is similar to the effect of a shift, inducing 
appreciation of the currency, in the trend of the real exchange rate path.  
In the case of U.S. manufacturing, Gourinchas (1998) studies the exchange rate 
response gross job flows at the four-digit level using data from the Longitudinal Research 
Database.  He finds that times of appreciation are associated with substantial job churning 
while times of depreciation display very limited reallocation.  In addition, he finds that 
10% depreciation increases employment by 0.3% in the tradable sectors, mostly due to 
job creation in import competing industries.  
Similarly for the U.S., Goldberg, Tracy and Aronson (1999) found using CPS data 
that  exchange  rate  movements  have  a  small  effect  on  employment  and  that  job 
destruction is not substantially affected.  For the U.S., Davidson and Matusz (2004) find 
higher  sectoral  net  exports  to  be  associated  with  less  job  destruction  and  more  job 
creation.  Also, Revenga (1992) finds that in the U.S. import competing industries reduce 
employment overall during currency appreciations. Finally, Campa and Goldberg (2001) 
find that in the U.S. the labor market adjustment to variations in the real exchange rate is 
primarily through wages rather than employment.  They explain the prevalence of price   7 
rather than quantity adjustment as the result of the lower labor demand associated with 
currency appreciation being offset by cheaper imported inputs, including equipment and 
machinery. 
Using  French  firm-level  data,  Gourinchas  (1999)  examines  the  impact  of  real 
exchange variations on gross job flows.  He finds that exchange rate appreciations reduce 
net employment growth as a result of lower job creation and increased job destruction. 
These  patterns  imply  little  additional  reallocation  as  a  result  of  exchange  rate 
fluctuations. By contrast, Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) find for a number of European 
countries a limited effect from currency value fluctuations on job flows.  Divergences in 
results across countries may be explained by differences in labor market institutions. For 
example, Burgess and Knetter (1998) find in that in the G-7 countries with the most rigid 
labor institutions, Germany and Japan, employment is, not surprisingly, insensitive to 
exchange rates.  However, in other countries appreciations appear related to drops in 
employment. 
In terms of cross-country evidence, Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) conduct a study 
on the extent of inter-sectoral reallocation of labor in the wake of trade liberalization 
events.  They find no evidence of increased reallocation of labor across sectors defined at 
the  1-digit  level,  although  they  find  evidence  of  a  small  increase  in  inter-sectoral 
reallocation using manufacturing data at the 3-digit level of aggregation.   
In developing countries undergoing deep financial liberalization, one might expect 
large reallocation effects given the substantial increase in the exposure to international 
competition. One important aspect of the reallocation process generated by the removal 
of barriers to trade relates to the impact on job flows. The literature examining the effect 
of  trade  reforms  on  job  flows  in  developing  countries  is  just  emerging.    A  notable 
exception is the paper by Levinsohn (1999) that reports evidence from firm-level data 
during a period of tariff reductions and large swings of the real exchange rate. There is a 
tremendous  amount  of  job  churning  in  Chile,  both  in  expanding  and  contracting   8 
industries, not associated with changes in aggregated employment. Hence, changes in 
trade exposure yield an effect on gross job flows without a substantial effect on net flows. 
In  view  of  absence  of  a  significant  net  employment  effect,  the  results  highlight  the 
important role played by both heterogeneity and nonconvexity emphasized by Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999) in the case of the U.S. 
In the Latin American context, there is new evidence for Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay in the present volume pointing to the importance of intra-industry reallocation 
and job flows in response to trade reform. Sanchez and Butler (in this volume) document 
that  in  Argentina  trade  liberalization  and  labor  market  reforms  have  facilitated 
reallocation and creative destruction, whereby inefficient incumbent firms are displaced 
by  more  efficient  producers.  Moreover,  more  openness  has  been  associated  with 
intensified  job  churning.  Indeed,  intra-  and  inter-sectoral  reallocations  have  enhanced 
productivity as import tariffs appear to have protected obsolete jobs. Ribeiro et al. (in this 
volume) study the effect of trade liberalization in Brazil.  The authors find that increased 
openness reduces net employment through increased job destruction, with no effect on 
job  creation.    In  addition,  exchange  rate  depreciations  expand  the  number  of  jobs  in 
manufacturing by  increasing creation,  with no effect on job destruction. Casacuberta, 
Fachola and Gandelman (in this volume) study the impact of trade liberalization on labor 
market flows in the Uruguayan Manufacturing Sector.  They find that higher international 
exposure  substantially  increases  job  destruction,  while  moderately  increasing  job 
creation.  Therefore, lower tariffs are associated with higher gross job flows and lower 
net job growth.  
By and large, the existing literature on tariff and exchange rate response finds 
effects on gross and net employment flows, although the results differ across countries.  
Gross  job  flows  generally  seem  to  increase  with  greater  exposure  to  international 
competition.  Exposure to foreign competition induces substantial labor adjustment with 
an impact on net employment growth in some cases.     9 
 
3.  TRADE  RESTRICTIONS  AND  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  IN  LATIN 
AMERICA  
Latin American countries constitute excellent laboratories to analyze the effects of 
changes in trade policy on job reallocation.  Until the mid-1980s, trade policies aimed at 
keeping sectors protected through high tariffs and import restrictions.  Yet, the collapse 
of economic growth and the high inflation rates in the 1980s eliminated the credibility of 
the import-substitution model and set the stage for trade opening.  In the last twenty 
years, the countries of this region have profoundly reduced their tariff  and non-tariff 
restrictions, and these changes have been larger than those experienced by developed 
countries during the same period (World Bank, 1996).  This shift was facilitated by the 
multilateral  commitments  of  the  Uruguay  Rounds  of  the  GATT,  by  the  signing  of 
bilateral and sub-regional agreements, and by unilateral reforms within countries.  
Figure  1  shows  the  evolution  of  average  tariffs  in  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay for the periods in which information on job reallocation 
is available. 
2 A downward trend is visible in all countries.  In Chile, trade liberalization 
started in the late seventies, but it was reversed in the early eighties as a response to a 
severe economic contraction.  After 1985, tariffs fell from 25% in that year to less than 
10% in the late nineties.  In Colombia, tariffs declined from 20% in 1985 to 7% by 1994. 
In Mexico, the signature of NAFTA implied a reduction in tariffs of goods imported from 
the U.S. and Canada from 5% to 1.3%.  In Uruguay, the change in tariffs was even more 
pronounced.  Tariffs in the manufacturing sector fell from an average of 37% in 1985 to 
13% in the year 1995.  By contrast, the decline in tariffs was slower in Argentina and 
Brazil.  In Argentina, average tariffs declined slowly during the first half of the nineties, 
only to increase again during the second half of the decade.  Similarly, in Brazil, a sharp 
decline in tariffs in the early nineties, was followed by a progressive increase after 1994.    10 
An  important  feature  of  the  liberalization  process  was  the  adoption  of  more 
uniform tariff structures.  Figure 2 shows a marked reduction in the standard deviation of 
average 2-digit sector tariffs in all countries with the exception of Colombia, where such 
dispersion fell from 1984 to 1994.  Another way to see this convergence effect is to 
regress the average yearly change in sector tariffs between the first period and the last 
period of the sample on initial sector tariff levels.  As shown in Table 1, the coefficient of 
this regression is negative and strongly statistically significant, indicating that sectors that 
started with higher tariff levels experienced the greatest tariff reductions. Initial tariffs 
also explain a large share of average yearly tariff changes.  In the bivariate regression, 
initial tariffs explain 61% of the variance in tariff changes.  Once country and sector 
effects are included, these variables jointly explain 95% of the average yearly changes in 
tariffs.    Thus,  more  than  being  driven  by  the  interests  of  particular  industries,  trade 
liberalization  was  the  results  of  an  overall  shift  in  economic  orientation.    This  is  an 
important consideration in the empirical analysis since it suggests that average sector 
tariff  changes  were  exogenous  to  changes  in  sector  employment  reallocation.  This 
however, does not eliminate the possibility that sector tariffs are driven by aggregate 
shocks, which in turn are correlated with sector reallocation. 
In the six countries studied, the process of removal of protectionist barriers was 
accompanied by real exchange rate appreciations (RER).  Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
the real exchange rate (RER) defined as domestic currency per U.S. Dollar, divided by 
the ratio of domestic to U.S. consumer price index (CPI).  The data shows a significant 
downward trend in the RER of Chile, Mexico and Uruguay.  It also shows substantial 
exchange  rate  appreciation  in  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Colombia  during  the  periods  in 
which tariffs declined more rapidly.  In the next section, we exploit this large variation in 
trade policy and real exchange rates to estimate the effect of changes in trade protection 
on job reallocation.  
   11 
4. EFFECTS OF TRADE ON JOB REALLOCATION 
4.1 Data description   
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), we define job reallocation (SUM) as 
the sum of job creation (POS) and job destruction (NEG), and the net change in jobs 
(NET)  as  the  difference  between  the  two. 
3    In  some  of  our  analysis  we  also  use  a 
measure  of  excess  reallocation  (EX-SUM).    Excess  reallocation  is  defined  as  the 
difference between job reallocation and the absolute value of net job creation. 
4  In the 
absence  of  heterogeneous  job  creation  and  destruction  patterns  across  firms  within 
sectors, excess job reallocation would be zero. 
The data used in this paper includes sector information at the two-digit level on 
nine manufacturing industries for six Latin American countries, during the 1980s and 
1990s.  The number of years covered differs across countries and range between 7 and 21 
years (see Table A.1). We use firm-level data for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, whereas 
for Chile, Colombia and Uruguay we use plant-level data.  Entry and exit data were 
available for all countries, with the exception of Argentina and Uruguay.  For these two 
countries we construct job flows using only continuous plants. 
Trade policy variables are also gathered using different sources and according to 
different definitions, which vary somewhat from country to country.  For Argentina and 
Brazil, data on average  sector tariffs were obtained from the World  Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) a tariff database created by the World Bank and UNCTAD.  In these 
two countries, the data refers to the average Most Favored Nation Rate. 
5  For Mexico, 
the data were obtained from López-Córdova (2003) and refers to the simple average of 
tariffs  on  imports  from  Canada  and  the  U.S.  Since  Mexican  tariffs  on  imports  from 
countries outside NAFTA declined only moderately during the period covered in our 
sample, and imports from North America represent the bulk of all Mexican imports, the 
evolution of tariffs on Canadian and U.S. commodities is a good measure of the process 
of trade liberalization in Mexico (see Lopez-Córdova (2003)).  For Colombia, tariff data   12 
were  obtained  from  Medina,  Melendez  and  Seim  (2003)  and  refer  to  implicit  sector 
tariffs, that is, the ratio of tariff collection to imports per sector.  For Uruguay, the data 
refers to average tariff per sector data and is obtained from Casacuberta et al. (2003).  
Finally, data on Chile was obtained from Rojas et al (2001), and refers to the average 
tariff for the whole economy.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of job flows for industries at the two-digit 
level for each country and for the whole sample. For the overall sample, employment at 
the industry level is falling on average at an annual rate of 0.5 percent.  This decline is 
higher  than  three  percent  in  Argentina  and  Uruguay,  countries  undergoing  deep 
recessions  during  the  years  covered  in  this  study.    The  only  country  with  a  large 
expansion  in  manufacturing  employment  is  Mexico,  with  at  annual  rate  of  6.8%.  
Substantial average job growth in Mexico is due to the expansion in manufacturing after 
the creation of NAFTA as well as the increase in the coverage of the survey used in this 
study. 
  Job reallocation is on average 21%, going from a minimum of 4.5% in “Basic 
Metal Industries” in 1985 to a maximum of 51% in “Manufacture of Wood and Wood 
Products” in 1988, in both cases in Chile.  Brazil stands out as the country with the 
highest job reallocation rates (32%), while Argentina (14%) and Uruguay (14%) have the 
lowest turnover in our sample because of lack of information on entry and exit in these 
countries.  Colombia is the country with the lowest rates among the sample of countries 
in which firm entry and exit data are available.  Cross-country comparisons, however, 
should be treated cautiously due to differences in the treatment of entry and exit, in the 
collection and nature of the data and in the definition and treatment of firm mergers.   
This is a standard problem in cross-country exercises, which we will be able to avoid by 
controlling for time, country and sector effects as well as country-specific trends and, in 
some specifications, for sector-country effects.    13 
For the whole pooled sample, job creation and destruction are equally important 
at accounting for the average level of job reallocation.  This is not the case for Mexico 
where job creation accounts for more than 60 percent of its turnover, and for Argentina 
and Uruguay where job destruction accounts for around 60 percent of job reallocation.  
Focusing on excess job reallocation (EX-SUM), we observe that for the whole sample 
and  for  each  country  most  of  sector  reallocation  is  within  sector.    Aggregate  annual 
employment variations at the two-digit sector level explain only 25 percent of total job 
reallocation in our sample. 
Table  3  shows  what  fraction  of  variation  in  SUM,  POS,  NEG  and  NET  is 
accounted for by country effects (row 1), sector effects (row 2) and year effects (row 3).  
For  job  turnover,  specific  country  characteristics  explain  almost  half  of  the  SUM 
variances  in  our  sample.    This  may  reflect  different  institutional  arrangement  across 
countries, like job security and level of openness, or it may reflect differences in data 
collection and measurement.  Interestingly, the high explanatory power of country effect 
comes mainly from the job creation component of job turnover which suggests that it is 
not simply driven by measurement factors since the latter are likely to impact both job 
creation and destruction symmetrically.  In fact, the country effect explains 50 percent of 
the  variance  of  POS  but  only  17  percent  of  NEG.    Besides  country  effects,  sector 
characteristics also explain an important fraction of the variance of job turnover in our 
sample (20%).  Taken together, country and sector effects explain more than 60 percent 
of the job reallocation variance (15 classes; row 4).  This percentage increases to 78 
percent when we consider country-sector interactions (54 classes; row 7).  This finding 
that there is substantial additional explanatory power from the interaction of countries 
and  sectors  is  especially  important  for  the  empirical  strategy  that  follows  since  it 
indicates that sectors exhibit quite different behavior across countries.  Finally, Table 3 
shows that year effects account for a minor fraction of the variance of job reallocation 
(13%).   14 
For net changes in employment (NET), year effects explain the largest fraction of 
the  variance  (23%)  suggesting  common  shocks  are  quite  important  in  the  sectoral 
variation  in  net  employment  growth  across  countries.    Put  differently,  these  results 
showcase the well-know fact that these economies were commonly affected by the Debt, 
Tequila, Asian and Russian crises during the 1980s and 1990s.  Country-specific effects 
explain 15 % of the variance, whereas sector effects have modest explanatory power.  
Taking together the country and year effects (31 classes; row 5) they explain 41 percent 
of the variance.   This increases to 68%, if  we  consider country-year interactions (90 
classes; row 8).  
Figure  3  describes  the  evolution  of  SUM,  NET  and  average  tariffs,  at  the 
manufacturing level for the six countries we are studying. 
6  For Argentina and Uruguay, 
the figure shows a continuous decline in employment in manufacturing, in particular after 
1998.  The opposite is true for Mexico.  After the tequila crises and NAFTA, employment 
in manufacturing has been growing fast.  In particular, during 1996 and 1997 when we 
observe  the  rate  of  job  growth  at  the  two-digit  level.    In  Chile,  employment  growth 
reflects  the  business  cycle.    At  the  beginning  of  the  sample  during  the  debt  crisis, 
employment fell drastically in the Chilean manufacturing sector.  After that, there was a 
long period of expansion that ended with the Asian crisis of 1997.  In 1998 and 1999 (i.e., 
the time of the Russian Crisis) manufacturing employment fell by more than 15 percent. 
Colombia shows a stable path until 1997.  However, during the Asian crisis, employment 
fell by 6 and 10 percent in 1998 and 1999, respectively.  
At the aggregate manufacturing level over time, job reallocation has been more 
stable than net changes in jobs.  For each country, the aggregate time series variance of 
NET is more than twice the variance of SUM.  We do not observe clear trends in job 
reallocation for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.  Instead, the data suggests a positive trend 
in job reallocation in Colombia and Brazil.  Finally, in Mexico there is a clear fall in   15 
turnover after 1997.  The average reallocation in the first part of the sample in Mexico is 
30% which falls to less than 25% after 1997.  
In most countries we observe a negative correlation between job turnover and net 
changes  in  jobs  at  the  aggregate  manufacturing  level.  This  pattern  does  not  hold  for 
Mexico and Uruguay, although in neither of these two cases the correlation between NET 
and SUM is statistically significantly different from zero.  For the two countries in which 
we have long time-series, Chile and Colombia, there is a clear and statistically significant 
negative correlation between NET and SUM (see Table 3). This result implies that job 
destruction is more volatile than job creation and is similar to the one found for the U.S. 
However, it is not the focus of this paper to focus on the aggregate time series variation.   
Figure 1 does not show a systematic correlation between job reallocation and the 
level of tariffs.  For Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, mean tariffs and turnover 
have a positive correlation, although it is statistically significant at standard level only for 
Mexico (i.e., at the 10 percent level).  For Chile and Colombia this correlation is negative 
although  not  statistically  significant.  These  simple  aggregate  correlations  should  be 
treated  cautiously  since  they  do  not  control  for  contemporaneous  changes  in  other 
covariates (such as exchange rates).  In addition, they do not exploit the variability at the 
sectoral level.  In the next section, we estimate the effect of tariffs and exchange rates on 
job reallocation making use of sector level data and controlling for other covariates. 
 
4.2. Empirical strategy 
  Our main analysis focuses on the impact of trade reforms on the pace of job 
reallocation and net employment growth within sectors within each country.  For this 
purpose,  we  focus  on  a  summary  measure  of  gross  job  flows  –  in  particular  job 
reallocation.  We use overall job reallocation rather than excess job reallocation in this 
analysis since the latter has some limitations when using high frequency data.  That is, if 
job reallocation takes time such that a change in the economic environment leads to an   16 
increase in job destruction in one period and an increase in job creation in subsequent 
periods,  the  measure  of  excess  job  reallocation  will  not  capture  such  increases  in 
reallocation. 
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We  specify  the  main  job  flows  (gross  job  reallocation)  and  net  employment 
regressions as follows: 
SUMjct  680jct-1 7DULIIjct-1 + Dj + Dt + D0c + D1cW -6ct jct, 
(1) 
 
NETjct  1(7jct-1 7DULIIjct-1 + Dj + Dt + D0c + D1cW -6ct jct, 
(2) 
 
where  SUMjct  and  NETjct  are  job  flow  (gross  job  reallocation)  and  net  employment 
measures  in  sector  j  and  country  c  and  at  time  t;  and  SUMjct-1  and  NETjct-1  are  the 
corresponding  lagged  values.    Dj,  Dt,  and  D0c  are  sector,  time  and  country  effects, 
respectively,  and  the  term  D1ct  captures  country-specific  trends.    Some  specifications 
include a job security measure, JSct, since job security provisions where changing over 
the  period  of  study  in  several  of  these  countries,  including  Argentina,  Brazil  and 
Colombia.  Tariffjct-1 captures the effect of taxes on imports in sector j and country c at 
time t-1 on job flows and net employment, where the lag of tariffs is included to avoid 
capturing reverse causality.  Thus, while we showed that changes in tariffs were, to a 
large extent, driven by a change in policy regime, it could still be the case that some 
sectors affected by job reallocation or employment losses engaged in intense lobbying to 
protect these sectors. 
Equations (1) and (2) are the main specifications but there are likely other factors 
impacting the pace of job reallocation and net employment growth within sectors even 
though we have a very rich set of controls (country effects, year effects, sector effects and 
country-specific trends).   For current purposes, our main interest is to explore additional   17 
factors that may be capturing or related to changes in the trade environment.  Thus, we 
also consider specifications where we include the lagged real exchange rate (RER) as a 
regressor as follows: 
SUMjct  680jct-1 1Tariffjct-1 2¨5(5ct  + Dj + Dt + D0c + D1ct -6ct jct, 
(3) 
NETjct   1(7jct-1 1Tariffjct-1 2¨5(5ct + Dj + Dt + D0c + D1ct  -6ct jct, 
(4) 
 
where ¨RERct is the log first difference in the real exchange rate in country c between 
time t and t-1.  We use the growth rate of the real exchange rate because we are interested 
in how cyclical real exchange rates affect job flows and net employment.  In principle, 
we would like to use sector-specific exchange rate measures as in Klein et al. (2003), but 
these are not readily available for our sample of Latin American countries.  Given the 
limitations of the data and concerns about measurement problems, omitted variable or 
endogeneity  biases  associated  with  exploring  the  role  of  the  exchange  rates  in 
specifications with the exchange rate, we also include a number of additional controls. 
First,  because  changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate  may  be  affected  by  changes  in  the 
consumer price index within countries and across sectors, we control for country-sector 
interactions in these specifications.  In addition, since countries have different trends in 
real wages and labor intensity differs across industries, sectoral trends will be different 
across countries.  Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that changes in the real exchange 
rate in our data come mainly from changes in the nominal exchange rate.  Second, we 
control for changes in GDP in these specifications because real exchange realignments 
may coincide with cyclical changes in the economy which directly affect job reallocation 
and net employment.  Failing to control for changes in GDP, thus, would overestimate 
the effect of real exchange rates on job reallocation and net employment.
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4.3 Results  
Table 5 reports the results on job reallocation.  Columns (1) and (2) show results 
of specification (1) with and without job security measures.  In all specifications, the 
coefficients on the lagged value of job reallocation in Table 5 show that job reallocation 
adjusts  slowly,  since  job  reallocation  in  period  t  depends  largely  on  job  reallocation 
during period t-1. 
In terms of the main focus of the analysis, the results show that job reallocation 
decreases as tariffs rise.  In particular, a decrease in tariffs of one standard deviation 
(7.5%) increases job flows by slightly more than half a percent (0.6%) which reflects 
variation that accounts for about 7 percent of the overall pooled standard deviation of job 
reallocation   
The results are similar whether we include or exclude a job security measure.   In 
terms of the latter, job security has seemingly little effect on job reallocation which is a 
bit surprising.  However, since we are exploiting country, sector, year variation in the job 
flows and only have country-year variation in job security and also include country, year, 
sector  dummies  and  country-specific  trends  as  controls,  it  is  likely  that  we  have 
insufficient variation remaining to capture much of an effect here.  A better approach for 
gauging  the  impact  of  job  security  is  likely  the  approach  taken  by  Micco  and Pagés 
(2004) and Caballero et al. (2004).   
  Columns (3)-(5) report results including the annual percentage change in the real 
exchange rate as well.  The results show that a fall in the real exchange rate has a similar 
effect to a tariff reduction, i.e., an appreciation increases job reallocation.  In particular, 
using the coefficients from Column (5) shows that a decrease in the real exchange rate by 
one standard deviation (11%) increases job reallocation by almost one percent (0.9%).  
This  means  that  the  impact  of  a  cyclical  appreciation  is  similar  to  that  of  a  tariff 
reduction, but larger in magnitude, taking into account the respective standard deviations. 
The results are similar when we include country-sector interactions and when we control   19 
for changes in GDP.  It is also useful to emphasize that the results on the impact of tariffs 
are  quite  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  these  other  factors  like  real  exchange  rates  and 
changes in GDP.  That is, the sign, magnitude and significance of the coefficient on 
tariffs in the job reallocation regressions is quite similar across specifications. 
  Table 6 reports the results of tariffs and real exchange rates on net employment 
based on equations (2) and (4).  The results are less robust for net employment.  For 
tariffs, the results show that a negative effect of tariffs when we do not control for job 
security measures, but the effect disappears when we include a job security index in 
Column (2).  Moreover, controlling for country-sector interactions indicates that higher 
tariffs actually increase employment by protecting many sectors from competition.  This 
latter finding is consistent with the result in the literature that reducing tariffs induces a 
net contraction in employment, at least temporarily.   The implied impact in column 5 is 
large with a tariff reduction of one standard deviation (7.5%) yielding a decline in net 
employment growth of about 1.6 percent.  We interpret this latter finding cautiously since 
the  sign  and  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  on  tariff  changes  is  quite  sensitive  to 
alternative specifications.   
A real exchange rate appreciation has a positive effect on net employment growth, 
but it is only marginally significant and relatively small in magnitude when including 
GDP changes (a one standard change in the real exchange rate yields about a half percent 
change in net  employment  growth).    It is our  sense that the larger magnitude of the 
effects of real exchange rate changes in specifications without GDP changes primarily 
reflects  real  exchange  rate  fluctuations  proxying  for  other  cyclical  factors.    Once  we 
control  for  such  cyclical  factors,  there  is  less  influence  of  exchange  rates  on  net 
employment. 
Indeed, the results in Table 6 imply that a currency appreciation is associated with 
lower  net  employment.  While  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  real  exchange  on 
employment becomes much smaller when GDP growth is controlled for, it still remains   20 
significant and positive. These results contrast with most of the literature examining the 
effect  of  trade  exposure  on  employment.  Usually  the  intensification  of  international 
competition  is  found  to  generate  either  lower  employment,  due  to  decreased  labor 
demand, or no discernible response from net employment.  
The  explanation  behind  the  contrasting  effects  between  our  results  and  earlier 
ones, found mostly in industrialized economies, is that changes in the real exchange rate 
affect  employment  in  two  ways.  First,  appreciation  of  the  local  currency  exposes 
domestic producers to stiffer international competition. The loss of market share yields 
lower labor demand. Second, currency appreciation makes imported inputs less costly 
(see  e.g.,  Campa  and  Goldberg,  2001).  Specifically,  the  price  of  equipment  and 
machinery goes down. Also, in Latin American countries, there is some evidence that 
currency appreciation lowers finance costs (see e.g. Galindo, Panizza and Schiantarelli, 
2003).  As  investment  rises,  labor  demand  increases.  Hence,  there  are  two  offsetting 
effects of appreciation on employment. Labor demand decreases as output falls due to 
intensified international competition. At the same time, labor demand increases due to job 
creation associated with capital formation. The latter effect seemingly dominant in our 
sample is more likely to be important in Latin America than in the U.S. or European 
countries as there is much more reliance in developing countries on imported capital and 
external finance.   
To sum up, our most robust results are with respect to tariffs, exchange rates and 
job  reallocation.    We  find  that  a  reduction  in  tariffs  and  an  appreciation  of  the  real 
exchange rate increase job reallocation.  We find mixed evidence on the impact of net 
employment  from  these  trade  variables.    In  what  might  be  viewed  as  our  preferred 
specification (Column (5) of Table 6 which has all controls), we find that a reduction in 
tariffs is associated with a decline in employment and a real appreciation is associated 
with an increase in employment.    21 
Several factors may underlie our less robust results on net employment.  For one, 
year  effects  and  country-specific  trends  account  for  a  much  larger  fraction  of  the 
variation in net employment growth by themselves so our controls may be capturing a 
larger fraction of the variation.  For another, the literature has found mixed results on net 
employment growth consistently with the existence of offsetting effects from currency 
appreciations as highlighted by Campa and Goldberg (2001).  Finally, it may be that our 
controls  for  other  cyclical  factors  in  the  net  employment  growth  regressions  are 
inadequate.    We  know  from  the  analysis  of  variance  that  country-year  interactions 
account  for  a  large  fraction  of  net  employment  growth  fluctuations  suggesting  that 
finding adequate cyclical controls is especially important for net employment growth. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
Understanding  the  resource  allocation  consequences  of  economic  reforms  is 
critical for policy evaluation but data limitations have made such evaluation difficult.   
The recent literature on factor reallocation has emphasized that much of the reallocation 
of factors across producers in market economies is across producers within sectors rather 
than  between  sectors  so  that  the  traditional  approach  of  examining  the  sectoral 
reallocation consequences of economic reforms potentially misses much of the story. 
In  this  paper,  we  exploit  newly  available  measures  of  gross  job  flows  at  the 
country, sector, and year level for Latin American economies.  These rich new data are 
harmonized  using  closely  related  datasets  and  measurement  methodologies  in  the 
respective countries.  Still, even here data limitations suggest that exploiting simply the 
between country variation is fraught with difficulties so it is especially useful to be able 
to exploit the variation within countries across sectors.  To be clear, we are exploiting the 
job reallocation within sectors across time within countries but in turn exploiting the 
variation in such within sector, within country  variation across sectors, countries and 
time.    Our  simple  analysis  of  variance  suggests  that  pursuing  this  approach  has   22 
considerable promise as the evidence suggests that while there are common sector effects 
in all countries there is substantial explanatory power from the interaction of country and 
sector effects. 
In terms of reforms, we focus our attention on trade reforms.  This focus on trade 
reforms is appropriate in this context for two closely related reasons.  For one, much of 
the reforms in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (the time period for our sample) 
focus on making domestic markets more competitive via trade reform.  For another, the 
trade reforms have potentially differential impacts across sectors as the tariffs themselves 
vary by sector but also the sensitivity of sectors to trade reforms likely differs across 
sectors. 
We find that trade reforms have significant effects on the pace of job reallocation 
within sectors. However, the effects are not that large given the magnitude of the changes 
undergone by the countries during the analyzed period.  Lowering tariffs increases the 
pace of job reallocation which is consistent with the hypothesis that reforms will aid in 
improving allocative efficiency.  However, such improvements are not without costs.  For 
one, reallocation itself is costly.  For another, we find some evidence that a reduction in 
tariffs is also associated with a decline in net employment growth.   
The analysis in this paper is only one small step towards policy evaluation of 
trade reform (or other market reforms) that takes into account the impact of policy on 
factor reallocation.  Several other steps are required including understanding what are the 
efficiency  consequences  of  factor  reallocation  (i.e.,  the  extent  to  which  enhanced 
reallocation from trade reforms is productivity enhancing) and what are the consequences 
for workers caught up in the increased pace of reallocation.  In addition, consideration of 
an  explicit  structural  model  that  permits  welfare  evaluation  of  all  of  these  issues  is 
required.  While all of these steps are well beyond the scope of this paper, the analysis in 
this  paper  suggests  that  developing  the  data  infrastructure  that  permits  this  type  of 
analysis and in turn the associated structural models has great promise for future research.    23 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1.  The difference between the models is that while Melitz endogenizes the range of varieties 
produced and traded in each country, Eaton and Kortum endogenize the distribution of 
mark-ups among countries by holding varieties fixed. 
2.  Tariffs for Colombia are defined as the ratio of tariff collection to total imports. For 
Mexico tariffs are defined as the average tariffs from goods and services imported from 
Canada and the  US.  For the  rest  of  the  countries tariff  data  refer to the  unweighted 
average of tariffs levied on imports from all countries. See section 4 for a detailed list of 
sources.   
3.  Job Creation is defined as the sum of employment changes for plants that increase labor 
between year t-1 and year t, divided by the average total employment in years t-1 and t. 
Job  Destruction  is  the  negative  of  the  sum  of  employment  changes  for  plants  that 
decrease labor between year t-1 and year t, divided by the average total employment in 
years t-1 and t. By construction, job destruction is positive.  
4.  See Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).  
5.  Unfortunately,  such  dataset  only  cover  information  for  the  nineties,  and  it  is  quite 
incomplete  for  some  countries,  such  like  Uruguay.    To  obtain  information  for  those 
years/countries we had to find alternative sources of tariff data.  
6.  SUM  and  NET  at  the  manufacturing  level  is  computed    as  the  two-digit  industries 
average weighted by employment (average employment between t and t-1). We report the 
simple average mean Tariff for the manufacturing sector.  
7.  Put differently, excess job reallocation is a better measure when using averages across 
time and exploiting cross sectional variation only.  
8.  Including an aggregate growth measure is consistent with the specification in Klein et al. 
(2003) who include it as we do as a control variable.  They argue that reverse causality is 
implausible since it is unlikely that sectoral job flows cause GDP.  This argument is 
likely more persuasive in their case since they use 4-digit data.  However, we note even 
in their case that there still may be a problem since common shocks that impact GDP and 
sectoral job flows make the interpretation of the coefficients on the aggregate growth 
term difficult to interpret at best.  However, like Klein et al. (2003) we regard including 
the growth of GDP as a useful control in this context.   One way to overcome these 
concerns would be an IV approach.  In unreported results, we explored specifications in 
which GDP changes are instrumented with GDP changes of trade partners, weighting by 
the relative importance of the trade partners.   The results that emerge from these IV 
specifications are generally quite similar to those that we report here.  We do not focus on 
these IV results since we believe our results using the exchange rate are only exploratory 
given that we do not have sector-specific exchange rates.  In contrast, our tariff measures 
vary by sector in addition to by country and year so we place greater emphasis and 
confidence on those results. 
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Table 1: Impact of Initial Tariffs on Average Yearly Changes in Tariffs 
 
  (1)  (2) 
     
Initial Tariffs   -.053*** 
(0.005) 
-.066*** 
(0.005) 
Country  and  Sector 
Fixed Effects 
NO  YES 
     
R²  0.61  0.95 
N  60  60 
     
 
Note: *** indicates coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level.  For Chile and Colombia, the initial 
year is taken to be 1985.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  All Countries  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Mexico  Uruguay 
               
SUM  0.215 
(0.083) 
0.141 
(0.033) 
0.321 
(0.042) 
0.238 
(0.085) 
0.198 
(0.055) 
0.279 
(0.068) 
0.138 
(0.042) 
Excess SUM  0.11 
(0.053) 
0.089 
(0.032) 
0.164 
(0.032) 
0.119 
(0.07) 
0.103 
(0.042) 
0.105 
(0.041) 
0.088 
(0.043) 
POS  0.162 
(0.079) 
0.096 
(0.032) 
0.279 
(0.046) 
0.166 
(0.078) 
0.159 
(0.053) 
0.201 
(0.069) 
0.089 
(0.037) 
NEG  0.105 
(0.057) 
0.053 
(0.032) 
0.158 
(0.035) 
0.119 
(0.055) 
0.095 
(0.034) 
0.174 
(0.055) 
0.05 
(0.026) 
NET  -0.005 
(0.071) 
-0.036 
(0.045) 
-0.006 
(0.052) 
0.0 
(0.092) 
-0.008 
(0.053) 
0.068 
(0.069) 
-0.038 
(0.057) 
Tariff  0.145 
(0.073) 
0.174 
(0.04) 
0.14 
(0.042) 
0.135 
(0.053) 
0.153 
(0.082) 
0.042 
(0.03) 
0.211 
(0.074) 
Real Exchange 
Rate 
110 
(24) 
108 
(8) 
120 
(24) 
108 
(22) 
108 
(18) 
81 
(11) 
139 
(28) 
Real Exchange 
Rate Growth 
0.004     
(0.109) 
-0.033    
(0.098) 
0.030     
(0.155) 
0.028     
(0.021) 
0.023 
   (0 .062) 
0.006    
(0.160) 
-0.085    
(0.038) 
GDP Growth  0.037    
(0.041) 
0.036     
(.055) 
0.028    
(0.021) 
0.050    
(0.051) 
0.033    
(0.025) 
0.034    
(0.042) 
0.029    
(0.032) 
               
N  646  99  72  160  189  63  63 
               
For each variable the first row present the average and the second, in parenthesis, the standard deviation.    30 
 
Table 3: Analysis of Variance for Pooled Data 
  SUM  POS  NEG  NET 
         
Country Effects  0.47  0.49  0.17  0.15 
Sector Effects  0.2  0.12  0.13  0.02 
Year Effects  0.13  0.13  0.22  0.23 
Country and Sector Effects  0.68  0.62  0.29  0.17 
Country and Year Effects  0.51  0.55  0.37  0.41 
Sector and Year Effects  0.33  0.25  0.35  0.25 
Country-Sector Interactions  0.78  0.7  0.36  0.21 
Country-Year Interactions  0.58  0.66  0.58  0.68 
         
Variance  0.007  0.006  0.003  0.005 
         
 
Notes: The variance reports the job flows variances in our sample.   31 
 
Table 4: Time Series Correlations 
  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Mexico  Uruguay 
             
SUM and NET  -0.024  -0.019  -0.49*  -0.553*  0.258  0.388 
SUM and Average Tariff  0.009  0.104  -0.277  -0.361  0.706*  0.446 
NET and Average Tariff  0.577*  -0.187  -0.682*  0.051  -0.205  0.946* 
             
 
Notes: SUM and NET represent job reallocation and net changes at the manufacturing level, respectively.  Average Tariffs are calculated for the entire 
manufacturing sector. * indicates 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Evolution of Tariffs and Real Exchange Rates in Six Latin American Countries
Data from  IMF, WorldBank, and other sources. See Section 4 for a detailed list of sources. 
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Figure 2 
 
Standard Deviation of Average 2-digit ISIC sectorTariff in Six Latin American Countries
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Note: See data sources and description in text.Figure 3: Job Flows Dynamics 
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Table 5: Effects of Tariffs and Exchange Rates on Job Reallocation 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Lagged Job Reallocation  0.559** 
(0.043) 
0.56*** 
(0.043) 
0.555*** 
(0.043) 
0.258*** 
(0.046) 
0.257*** 
(0.046) 
Lagged Tariff  -0.082** 
(0.036) 
-0.074* 
(0.037) 
-0.071* 
(0.037) 
-0.089* 
(0.052) 
-0.088* 
(0.052) 
Job Security Index  -  0.0 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
0.0 
(0.01) 
Change in Real Exchange 
Rate 
-  -  -0.06*** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.068*** 
(0.018) 
-0.083*** 
(0.02) 
Change in GDP  -  -  -  -  -0.141* 
(0.077) 
           
Country-Sector Interactions  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
           
R²  0.828  0.828  0.83  0.868  0.869 
N  585  576  576  576  576 
           
 
Notes: All regressions include country effects, year effects, sector effects and country-specific trends.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. The job security 
measure comes from Heckman and Pages (2000). Tariff and real exchange rate data come from the IMF, World Bank, and individual countries. 
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Table 6: Effects of Tariffs and Exchange Rates on Net Employment 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Lagged Job Reallocation  0.268* 
(0.052) 
0.213*** 
(0.058) 
0.182*** 
(0.057) 
0.09 
(0.059) 
0.072 
(0.054) 
Lagged Tariff  -0.079** 
(0.049) 
-0.017 
(0.051) 
0.024 
(0.05) 
0.236*** 
(0.085) 
0.234*** 
(0.079) 
Job Security Index  -  0.048*** 
(0.016) 
0.051*** 
(0.017) 
0.042** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.015) 
Change in Real Exchange 
Rate 
-  -  -0.119*** 
(0.033) 
 
-0.132*** 
(0.032) 
-0.05* 
(0.027) 
Change in GDP  -  -  -  -  0.827*** 
(0.117) 
           
Country-Sector Interactions  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
           
R²  0.552  0.561  0.573  0.609  0.655 
N  585  576  576  576  576 
           
 
Notes: All regressions include country effects, year effects, sector effects and country-specific trends.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. The job security 
measure comes from Heckman and Pages (2000). Tariff and real exchange rate data come from the IMF, World Bank, and individual countries. 
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Table A.1: Job Reallocation Data Sources 
 
Country  Period  Sectors  Unit  Entry/Exit  Source       
Argentina  1991-2001  9  Firms  No  Butler and Sanchez (2004)     
Brazil  1992-2000  8  Plants  Yes  Ribeiro et al (2004) 
Chile  1980-1999  8  Plants  Yes  Bergoeing, Hernando & Repetto (2003)  
Colombia 1  1978-1999  9  Plants  Yes  Medina, Meléndez & Seim (2003)  
Mexico  1994-2000  9  Plants  Yes  Kaplan, Martínez & Robertson (2003)  
Uruguay 2  1989-1995  9  Plants  No  Casacuberta, Fachola & Gandelman (2004)  
 
Notes: All information is restricted to the manufacturing sector. Industries are defined using 2dig. ISIC rev2 classification.  
For Brazil and Mexico the data comes from the social security agencies; for the other four countries data comes from Manufacturing 
Surveys. 
1 Due to methodology changes in 1992, we drop this year.  
2 We do not use data prior to 1989 due to changes in the methodology and coverage of the survey. 
 
 
 